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In United States v. Harris,' a recent explication of the demands
of the Fourth Amendment, 2 the Supreme Court examined once again
"the recurring question of what showing is constitutionally necessary
to satisfy a magistrate that there is a substantial basis for crediting
the report of an [unidentified] informant ... who purports to relate
his personal knowledge of criminal activity."3 On one level, the case
of United States v. Harris can be seen as simply "another indication
of the determination of the Supreme Court's changing membership
to reverse the trend of the Warren Court's criminal procedure de-
cisions." 4 Upon analysis, however, the misfortunes of Roosevelt Harris,
"a trafficker in nontaxpaid distilled spirits" exposed by "a person
who fears for their life [sic] and property should their name be re-
ported,"3 can also convey a more basic message. For the plurality
t Member, New York Bar, LL.B. 1970, Yale Law School.
1. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
2. Since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), federal law has come to dominate the
search and seizure field. Mapp held that the Fourth Amendment, operating through
the Fourteenth, barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal search and
seizure from state trials.
3. 403 U.S. at 575. The question is not only "recurring," but also one of the most
important in the field of search and seizure law. Most search warrants are probably
granted on the basis of the hearsay testimony of unnamed informants. A study of search
warrants in one California city revealed that eighty-one per cent of all =arrants rested
on informer data. More than eighty-five per cent of these informer-based warrants did
not disclose the informants' identity. See S. BRODSKY, SEAct WARRANrS, HREAmAy Ei-
DENCE AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION: A CRITIQUE BASED ON CALIFORNIA F.rEiECE 29
(1965). An unpublished study of the issuance of warrants in a medium.sized Connecticut
city, in which the author participated, indicated that anonymous informants were the
source of the information for seventy-three per cent of all search warrants issued in 1963
and sixty-three per cent in 1969. See Appendix, Table 2 infra. Reliance on hearsay testi-
mony of informants is especially significant in narcotics cases. In the city studied, ninety
per cent and eighty-three per cent of all warrants for narcotics searches were founded
on informant reports in 1968 and 1969, respectively. The study is described in more
detail at pp. 708-12 infra.
4. Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HAav. L. Rnv. 46, 53 (1971).
5. 403 U.S. at 575.
The Yale Law Journal
opinion authored by Chief Justice Burger' is fundamentally a con-
tinuation, rather than a repudiation, of past Supreme Court analyses
of probable cause showings of search warrants based on informer testi-
mony.7 The last decade of decisions in this area has consisted entirely
of attempts to define standards which would prove the reliability of
anonymous informants." Yet it is doubtful that those standards-
whether applied strictly, as in the Warren era, or loosely, as presaged
by Harris-can successfully distinguish reliable from unreliable in-
former affidavits.
This Comment will suggest a new probable cause model which prom-
ises to be more capable of assuring the credibility of incriminating
information obtained from unidentified informants.
I. The Supreme Court's Search for Standards
Prior to Harris, the Supreme Court formulated, and later elab-
orated, a "substantial basis" test for undisclosed informer testimony.
The Court first specifically analyzed the use of hearsay information
provided by an unnamed informant to support a search warrant in
Jones v. United States.9 Almost unanimously,10 it upheld a warrant
based on a tip from a "reliable" informer who had given prior infor-
mation "which was correct" and who asserted that he had personally
purchased narcotics from the suspects."1 Responding to an objection
to the use of hearsay information from unidentified informants, the
Jones Court declared that "an affidavit is not to be deemed insuffi-
6. A bare majority of the justices voted to uphold the warrant presented, and of
these, only three could agree on any of the key points in the Chief Justice's opinion.
7. See pp. 706-08 infra.
8. See pp. 704-08 infra.
9. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Adumbrations of Jones are apparent in Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). In Draper, a "special employee" of the Bureau of Narcotics
who had always given "accurate and reliable" information in the past notified the
Bureau that James Draper "was peddling narcotics to several addicts' and supplied a
detailed description of Draper's appearance and where and when he could be appre-
hended carrying heroin. The Court found the arrest and incident search of Draper's
person valid, reasoning that since every other descriptive detail related by the informant
had proved to be true, the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that tle
one remaining unverified item-that the suspect was carrying heroin-was likewise cor-
rect. Id. at 313.
10. As in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), only Justice Douglas dissented,
protesting against the use of "faceless informers."
11. This information was corroborated by "other sources" and, to some extent, by
the fact that the persons implicated were known to be drug addicts. However, the officer
who obtained the warrant-solely on the basis of an affidavit that he had signed-did
not swear to the results of his own independent investigation of the claims made by
the informants. L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PRO-
cEDuRE 236 (3d ed. 1969).
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cient on that score, so long as a substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay is presented." 12 The "substantial basis" test of Jones was soon
refined and applied in Aguilar v. Texas' 3 to strike down a state search
warrant issued on the basis of an affidavit which recited, in relevant
part, that "[a]ffiants have received reliable information from a cred-
ible person and do believe that" narcotics were on the premises to be
searched.14 Building on Jones, the Court held that to enable a magis-
trate to determine when the hearsay statements of informants estab-
lish probable cause for a search warrant:1 5 (1) the affidavit must, in
order to preclude the possibility that the informant is relying on mere
rumor, indicate the circumstances from which the informer concluded
that evidence is present or that crimes are occurring;' 0 and (2) the
affiant must present the basis for his belief that the informant is trust-
worthy, thus reducing the possibility that a tip meeting the first
standard is no more than a well-embroidered fabrication.17
In Spinelli v. United States's the Court restated the Aguilar criteria
and confronted the question of whether a warrant affidavit found
defective under the two-pronged reliability test of Aguilar might be
"cured" by other averments contained in the affidavit. The entire
Court agreed 19 that supporting information could serve to establish
probable cause by buttressing an othenise unacceptable informant's
tip,2 0 although the majority found the corroborative information in
the Spinelli warrant insufficient.2 '
12. 362 U.S. at 269.
13. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
14. 378 U.S. at 109.
15. See generally Note, The Inforiner's Tip as Probable Cause for Search or Arrest,
54 CO RNELL L. REV. 958 (1969); Comment, Informer's Word as the Basis for Probable
Cause in the Federal Courts, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 840 (1965).
16. Note, supra note 4, at 55. See also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410. 416
(1969); Comment, supra note 15, at 841. This "particular knowledge" test places a pre-
mium on personal observation. If the informant claims first.hand knowledge, a detailed
description of the incriminating evidence observed may not be required. See Spinelli,
supra at 428 (White, J., concurring); cf. Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1963).
Moreover, by its very nature the standard as applied may differ from the Court's forntu-
lation. The acceptable statement "x is selling liquor to me" and the unacceptable state-
ment "x is selling liquor" may seem equivalent in the minds of the informant or the
officers drafting the warrant application. cf. Note, The Outwardly Sufficient Search
Warrant Affidavit: What If It's False?, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 96, 136-37 (1971).
17. See Note, supra note 4, at 55; Comment, supra note 15, at 846.47. For a discussion
of the problems in the operation of this rule, see Note, The Outwardly Sufficient Search
Warrant Affidavit, supra note 16, at 134-36.
18. 393 US. 410 (1969).
19. Justice Marshall took no part in the case.
20. See 393 U.S. at 438 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
21. An F.B.I. investigation indicated that the suspect was spending considerable time
at an apartment not his own which contained two telephones, whose numbers matched
those the informant had asserted Spinelli was using for illegal gambling acthities. In
addition, Spinelli was known to federal authorities as a bookmaker. With respect to
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United States v. Harris22 is significant principally because of its
willingness to embrace dubious corroborative assertions in an affidavit
in order to rescue an informer's tip which probably would have been
held unacceptable by the Warren Court. The affidavit in Harris
recited that a "prudent person" had told the affiant, a federal tax
investigator, that he had recently seen Harris selling untaxed liquor
and that no more than two weeks ago he had purchased some of the
bootlegged whiskey himself. In addition to the allegations concerning
the informant's report, mention was made of "a sizable stash of illicit
whiskey" once found in an abandoned house under Harris' control
and attention was drawn to Harris' reputation as a bootlegger..2 3
A bare majority of the Court upheld the magistrate's finding of
probable cause on the basis of this affidavit, though there was no
consensus on why that finding should be upheld. 24 The difficulties
with the warrant stemmed from the fact that no basis was given to
support the affiant's belief that the informant was generally trust-
worthy.25 Two of the majority Justices favored overcoming this ob-
stacle by overruling Spinelli or Aguilar.26 The Chief Justice's plurality
these independent investigative details, Justice Harlan's majority opinion noted that "at
most, these allegations indicated that Spinelli could have used the telephones specified
by the informant for some purpose," 393 U.S. at 417, and that the allegation that
Spinelli was "known" to the police as a gambler was "but a bald and unillumiatlng
assertion of suspicion that is entitled to no weight," id. at 414.
22. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
23. The affidavit read, in part:
Roosevelt Harris has had a reputation with me for over four years as being a traf-
ficker of nontaxpaid distilled spirits, and over this period I have received numerous
information [sic] from all types of persons as to his activities. Constable Howard
Johnson located a sizable stash of illicit whiskey in an abandoned house under
Harris' control during this period of time. This date, I have received information
from a person who fears for their life [sic] and property should their name be
revealed. I have interviewed this person, found this person to be a prudent person.
and have, under a sworn verbal statement, gained the following information: This
person has personal information of and has purchased illicit whiskey from within
the residence described, for a period of more than 2 years, and most recently within
the past 2 weeks, has knowledge of a person who purchased illicit whiskey within the
past 2 days from the house, has personal knowledge that illicit whiskey is con-
sumed by purchasers in the outbuilding known as and utilized as the "dance hall,"
and has seen Roosevelt Harris go to the other outbuilding, located about 50 yards
from the residence, on numerous occasions, to obtain the whiskey for this person
and other persons.
403 U.S. at 575-76.
24. The Chief Justice's opinion was joined by Justices Black and Blackmun who also
wrote separate concurring opinions. Justice Stewart joined in only part I of the plurality
opinion, and Justice White concurred only in part III of the Court's opinion.
25. No one denied that the affidavit met the first Aguilar.Spinelli test. An allegation
of personal observation suffices to show that an informant has based his particular
conclusions on reliable data. See 403 U.S. at 589 (dissenting opinion); ef. note 16 supra.
26. Justice Black desired to "wipe their holdings from the books," 403 U.S. at 585,
and Justice Blackmun wrote "a personal comment" in favor of overruling Spinelli, id.
at 585-86.
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opinion, however, contented itself with distinguishing the facts of
these cases, and, like Spinelli, indicated that a bare assertion of an in-
former's general reliability can be a basis for a finding of probable
cause only if it is corroborated by other factual data which supports
the affiant's opinion that the informant is trustworthy.27 Unlike
Spinelli, however, sufficient corroborative data was found. Because
the informant's statements were against his penal interest, they were
said to have "carried their own indicia of credibility,"28 and since
police knowledge of reputation is often accurate, the affiant's declara-
tions as to Harris' reputation as a bootlegger were considered "proba-
tive."2 9
Thus, although Haris, in its generous view of what facts are cor-
roborative, limits the significance of the Aguilar-Spinelli holdings,
the framework that these two cases constructed for analyzing informer-
27. The Chief Justice's opinion is remarkably opaque, but this interpretation is
strongly supported by the statement which concludes part I of that opinion and out-
lines the structure of the opinion as follows:
While a bare statement by an affiant that he believed the informant to be truthful
would not, in itself, provide a factual basis for crediting the report of an unnamed
informant, we conclude that the affidavit in the present case contains an ample
factual basis for believing the informant which, when coupled with his own knowl-
edge of the respondent's background, afforded a basis upon which a magistrate
could reasonably issue a warrant.
403 U.S. at 579-80.
28. 403 U.S. at 583. This inference is, at best, unconvincing. First, since an informant
is often compensated with a promise of non-prosecution or favorable treatment, super-
ficially incriminating statements may not be against penal interest at all. See id. at 595
(dissenting opinion). Indeed most informant testimony is probably putatively against
penal interest. See p. 713 infra. Second, if the reasoning were valid, it would have the
result of encouraging the state to prefer as informants participants in criminal enter-
prises rather than the ordinary citizen who from time to time may supply information
to police. 403 U.S. at 595 (dissenting opinion).
The Court was evenly divided on this issue. Justices Black, Blackmun and White
joined this portion of the Chief Justice's opinion, while the four dissenting Justices
expressed their unwillingness "to embrace such a speculative theory." Id. at 595.
29. 403 U.S. at 583. This, presumably, is what the Chief Justice meant when he
characterized a policeman's knowledge of a suspect's reputation as "something that
policemen frequently know and a factor that impressed such a 'legal technician' as Mr.
Justice Frankfurter." Id. Such treatment of reputation diverges sharply from Spinelli
(see note 21 supra), and only Justices Black and Blackmun joined this portion of the
Chief Justice's opinion. The cases are distinguishable in this regard only in that Harris'
reputation was based, at least in part, on the prior seizure of illicit liquor on his
property-a specific past event within the affiant's own knowledge. But see 403 US. at
596 (dissenting opinion); Note, supra note 4, at 58 n.28.
In dealing with reputation evidence, the Chief Justice looked to the language in Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 169 (1949).
In neither of these cases, however, was reputation evidence a decisive factor. The wvarrant
affidavit in Jones showed both general reliability and particular knowledge, and
Brinegar was replete with corroborative details uncovered by police surveillance. Re-
liance on police allegations of the suspect's reputation is an inadequate substitute for
a finding that the informer can be believed. See Note, supra note 4, at 58.59. And the
fact that the suspect may have had previous encounters with the police may be the
very reason that an unscrupulous informant thought he could incriminate the individual
with impunity.
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based warrants has by no means been dismantled.30 Affidavits which
relate the testimony of anonymous informants should set forth enough
of the underlying circumstances to demonstrate that there is reason
to believe both that the informer is a truthful person and that he has
based his particular conclusions in the matter at hand on reliable data.
Affidavits deficient in either of these respects can establish probable
cause only if they provide adequate information to corroborate the
informant's general reliability and/or particular knowledge.
II. The Existing Standards in Operation
In order to ascertain whether the Aguilar-Spinelli mode of evaluat-
ing informer-based warrants does, in fact, distinguish reliable from
unreliable informant data, the author participated in a study of the
issuance and effectiveness of search warrants in a medium-sized city
in Connecticut.31 This study was designed to determine, first, the
extent to which the Aguilar-Spinelli requirements were implemented
at the local level and second, the degree to which the use of these
tests succeeded in assuring the reliability of informant data.
30. Accordingly, lower courts are correct in employing the Aguilar.Spinelli tests In
post-Harris litigation. See, e.g., Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971),
Chrisman v. Field, 448 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1971); Manning v. United States, 448 F.2d 992
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 541 (1971).
31. The study was conducted by the author and Jeffrey N. Weisen, Esq., under the
supervision of Dean Abraham S. Goldstein and Professor Stanton Wheeler from October
1969, through June 1970, as part of the 1970 Senior Studies Program at the Yale Law
School.
Information on the warrant process was obtained by three main techniques: personal
interviews, examination of records, and direct observations. Those interviewed Included
six judges, five police detectives, five prosecutors, two attorneys of the public defender's
office, and two private attorneys. These interviews are the source of our impressions
relating to the attitudes of the local participants toward compliance with Supreme Court
standards described at pp. 709-11 infra.
The records examined were obtained from the files of granted search warrants main-
tained by the prosecutor's office. The search warrants are filed by year and divided
into two classes, those in which evidence was found and those in which no evidence
was uncovered. Each class is further divided by subject matter into four groups, gambling,
narcotics, liquor, and "other." See Appendix, Table 1 infra. We sampled 100 per cent
of the warrants for 1968 (a total of 145) and for 1969, we sampled fifty per cent of tie
gambling, liquor, and narcotics warrants and 100 per cent of the "other" warrants (for
a total of ninety-three).
Finally, direct observation of police, prosecutorial and judicial activities was carried
out twice a week for three months. We were permitted to enter judicial chambers on
six different occasions when arrest warrants were being signed, but, because of a fear
of "leaks," we were not allowed to observe the signing of search warrants.
The study also analyzed approximately 150 arrest warrants, most of which were based
on citizen complaints of misdemeanor violations. Our findings concerning the arrest
warrant process will be mentioned only insofar as they are suggestive of characteristics
of the search warrant process as well.
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A. Compliance
Search warrants in the city studied are drafted by two branches of
the police department. The vast majority of the warrants are pro-
duced by the Special Services Division, which investigates narcotics,
liquor, and gambling offenses. The Detective Division, which investi-
gates other crimes, processes a much smaller number of warrants,
typically relating to stolen goods.32
A deep ambivalence permeates the view the police take toward the
warrants they draft. The Special Services Division displays great pride
in drafting acceptable search warrants, and though the Detective Divi-
sion generally approaches warrants with less enthusiasm, 3 its insistence
in important cases on careful drafting matches that of the Special
Services. 34 Yet the diligence of both divisions is directed mainly at
the surface appearance of the warrants. 35 To minimize the discovery
function of a warrant, the police tend to reveal the least amount of
information necessary to meet judicial requirements. As a result, the
allegations contained in the warrants are highly standardized, with
identical paragraphs appearing in numerous warrants. 30
32. In 1968, a total of 145 search warrants were granted in the study area, and in
1969, the figure was 172. As Table I shows (see Appendix infra), the Special Services
Division was responsible for more than nine tenths of all warrants in both years in-
cluded in the study.
33. Some members of the Detective Bureau appeared more willing to cut comers
to avoid burdensome search warrant requirements. This may be because, as one officer
put it, not being specialists in warrant preparation like their colleagues in Special
Services, "the patrolmen like to avoid paper work [and] are always asking if they really
need a warrant in this situation." In addition, the nature of the searches (usually in-
volving stolen goods) makes the Bureau emphasize expeditious return of the property
over the painstaking investigation necessary to ensure conviction.
Although the Detective Division does not rely extensively on search warrants, it does
conduct a substantial number of searches. To do so, it relies primarily on consent. One
detective estimated that from seventy to eighty per cent of the suspects sign the Division's
consent form because:
They know if they don't sign we'll station cops around the house and get a warrant.
He [sic] can stop the search anytime. Sometimes, if you're getting warm, they'll
stop it. But most times not . . . . When they know they're going to be arrested,
they're cooperative. If they don't consent, they know the judge will wonder why
It's the same reason as why most murderers talk.
34. The captain of the Detective Division illustrated this attitude when he told us
of a recent murder case in which the suspect admitted he had been with the victim the
evening of the murder. Despite the fact that the suspect had offered to take the police
to his room to prove his innocence, the captain required the investigators to obtain a
warrant. In his words, "You know the state has to prove consent, and in an important
case we don't want to risk it."
35. Supreme Court pronouncements have had an impact on at least the drafting of
warrants by the police. Almost all warrants submitted by the police are approved, see
p. 710 infra, and ninety-eight per cent of the approved warrants we studied contained
assertions fulfilling at least one of the Aguilar-Spinelli reliability criteria.
36. The typical search warrant reviewed contains about ten paragraphs. For each
type of crime there appears to be a standard form into which differing defendant names,
addresses and other particulars are inserted. (In the detective bureau a protot)e warrant
is posted on the bulletin board of the office to aid the officers in their preparation.)
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The Connecticut Circuit Court judges 7 interviewed stated that
they carefully scrutinized each warrant application. Despite the fact
that less than two per cent of search warrant applications are rejected,38
the judges emphatically denied that they acted as mere "rubber-
stamps."30 Nevertheless, while the judges were knowledgeable about
Supreme Court standards as to search and seizure, 40 the quality of
their scrutiny is questionable. 41 Applying the Aguilar test of informer
A typical narcotics warrant begins as follows:
Sgt. X is a regular member of the . . . Police Department and is presently assigned
to the Special Services Division. He has a total of 19 years service, 6 of which are
with Special Services. He has been in charge of numerous narcotic investigations
and narcotic raids.
After several paragraphs stating the reliability of the informant, the dates upon which
"known addicts" were seen entering the suspect's apartment, or the date upon which
an informant "buy" was observed by the police, the warrant concludes with a paragraph
reviewing the grounds for probable cause.
The usual affidavit also contains a statement of items to be seized. In narcotics cases
this usually takes the following form:
Narcotics, dangerous drugs, misbranded drugs, narcotic paraphernalia, i.e,, eye drop-
pers, syringes, bottle caps (cookers), needles (hypodermic), water pipes, scales,
grinders, or other apparatus used for packing of narcotics.
In this fashion, the police may be given wide-ranging authority to seize a myriad of
items even though the evidence presented in the affidavit often does not support the
inference that they will all be present. For example, an affidavit may establish probable
cause to believe that narcotic sales are occurring, but may not support a conclusion
that narcotics are being used; hence, reference to narcotic paraphernalia, cookers, etc.
would not be justified.
37. Since in Connecticut the prosecutor is not required to sign or attest the search
warrant (CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 54-33a (1968)), he normally does not participate in
the process. Prosecutors report that even when police request their judgment as to the
adequacy of a warrant, the additional scrutiny is minimal. In addition to the lack of
legal duty, one reason often given for the cursory character of the prosecutor's review
was that the police are highly competent and draft "good" warrant applications. We
were told: "You'll find they're all exactly the same. The same guys draw then% up with
the same key words."
38. This was the figure quoted to us by police, prosecutors, and judges alike. We
were unable to verify its accuracy on the basis of the records at our disposal.
39. Although search warrant applications are presented to a judge in chambers
whenever possible, the need for speed sometimes causes the police to approach the bench
in open court or to seek the judge at home during non-court hours.
40. One judge, for instance, summarizes in notebook form all important probable
cause decisions as they are handed down by the Court.
41. Because we were not permitted to view the initiation, presentation, and signing
of the search warrants (see note 31 supra), we cannot substantiate by direct observation
our belief that judges do not carefully analyze these documents. Our conclusion, how-
ever, is supported by two other aspects of our study and agrees with the findings of
L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE, JR. & D. ROTENBERO, TnE DETEcTION OF CUIME 119-20 (1967).
First, as is indicated above, although only a fiftieth of the warrants are denied, approxi-
mately a sixth exhibit a questionable basis for probable cause even assuming the veracity
of all the allegations contained therein. Second, support for our inference is provided
by our study of arrest warrants. As with search warrants, every judge asserted that lie
did not rubber-stamp arrest warrants, but in the course of the same interviews, the
following illustrative comments were also made:
If the prosecutor and the police think there's probable cause, I'll sign even If I
have a little doubt . . . . They both review the warrants carefully.
They (the warrants] have been carefully reviewed by the prosecutors who know
what to look for before they come to me.
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reliability supplemented by the standards for curative corroborative
information suggested by Spinelli,42 we concluded that eighteen per
cent of the warrants approved by the judges in 1968 and sixteen per
cent of the 1969 warrants were of doubtful constitutional validity.
43
B. Success
The existence of this group of "questionable" warrants provided
an opportunity for evaluating the empirical validity of the Aguilar-
Spinelli requirements. We hypothesized that if the Supreme Court
standards actually selected out the unreliable informant data, the
group of questionable warrants would lead to a higher proportion of
Our findings suggest that these judicial assumptions are invalid. Connecticut law requires
a prosecutor to countersign arrest warrants before submission to the magistrate, but
the prosecutors we observed would, almost invariably, read through the documents for
the first time before the judge in chambers. One prosecutor explained that arrest
warrants are only skimmed because "if it doesn't work out, we can always nolle."
As with the arrest warrants, then, the judges may be disinclined to examine even the
surface allegations of the search warrant applications very closely in view of their high
regard for the competence of the police in drafting search warrants. Also, in some cir-
cumstances, the limited amount of time devoted to evaluating the warrant applications
may preclude meaningful review. Cf. Barrett, Criminal Justice: The Problem of Mass
Production, in THE COURTS, THE POLICE, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 85, 117-18 (H.W.
Jones ed. 1965).
42. See p. 705 supra. Since our evaluation of corroborative assertions which might
"cure" a warrant which would otherwise be rejected under the two Aguilar tests was
based on the Spinelli Court's strict treatment of such allegations, a portion of the warrants
which we labeled "questionable" would probably be found acceptable under the generous
approach of the Harris Court. See pp. 706-08 supra. Likewise, we used a demanding
interpretation of the Aguilar reliability tests in classifying warrants. See note 43 infra.
By doing so, we have shown that even a very strict application of the existing standards
may not enhance reliability of informant data.
43. See Appendix, Table 4 infra. A warrant was regarded as "questionable" only if
(1) it failed to meet the Aguilar requirements as to setting forth the basis for a belief
that the informant is generally reliable (general reliability deficiency) and that the
particular information he has supplied is based on reliable data (particular knowledge
deficiency) and (2) it failed to meet the Spinelli standard for remedying Aguilar de-
ficiencies by other assertions in the warrant affidavit (inadequate corroboration). In the
warrants in our sample, an effort to establish general reliability always took the form of
an allegation as to past information supplied by the informant. Cf. note 16 supra. A
warrant which did not allude to prior correct information leading to conviction was
considered deficient under the first criterion. Inadequate corroboration was more dif-
ficult to define with precision. We first determined whether the corroboration, if any,
took the form of general surveillance or an informer "buy." General surveillances were
then classified as "weak" if they uncovered information of only limited probative value,
as in Spinelli. See Appendix, Table 4 infra. The following were typical of the "weak"
surveillances we reviewed: reports that numerous persons entered and left, with no
visible purchases, stores which were allegedly fronts for illegal gambling or narcotics
sales; reports that an informer was observed to have walked in and out of a building
in which he asserted he had placed an illegal wager; and reports that someone, identified
by an informant as a policy runner who took slips from points A to B to C, in fact
travelled from points A to B to C. The "buy" technique is discussed at note 78 infra.
For the reasons given at note 82 infra and note 42 supra, "apartment house buys," like
"weak" surveillances, were regarded as insufficient to cure a warrant found questionable
under the first criterion.
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fruitless searches than would the warrants that clearly met the Aguilar-
Spinelli tests.
44
No such variation was found. In 1968, thirty-six per cent of all war-
rants produced no incriminating evidence whatsoever. 45 The failure
rate differed slightly as between "questionable" and "acceptable"
warrants, but the variation was not statistically significant. 46 Like-
wise, the extent to which the 1969 failure rate for "questionable"
and "acceptable" warrants diverged from the overall failure rate for
that year of thirty-one per cent4 7 was well within the bounds of normal
statistical fluctuations. 48 Accordingly, our data does not support the
hypothesis that even a strict version of the Supreme Court standards
provides a meaningful measure of the reliability of informer-based
warrants.
If attention is directed to the character and motivations of the
typical undisclosed informant, this result is readily explicable.49 Fre-
quently, informants are themselves criminals, 50 drug addicts, 51 or
even pathological liars. 52 For instance, one prosecutor described the
typical narcotics informant as "a guy who made a purchase a half-
hour ago. He was stopped for possession, and the police make a deal
with him, exchanging release for information." 5 Obviously, such
44. We do not mean to suggest that the existence of probable cause turns on the
ultimate success of a search in uncovering evidence of criminality. On the contrary, the
probability that a search will be successful is but one of many elements which are
involved in the concept of probable cause. See note 64 infra. We focus on success only
as a measure of the reliability of informant tips-a factor which the Supreme Court
has regarded as of paramount importance in assessing probable cause in the case of
informer-based warrants. See pp. 704-08 supra.
Nor do we maintain that unreliability of informant testimony is the only possible
cause for a warrant's failure to lead to the seizure of the items specified. In some in-
stances, especially in searches for narcotics and policy slips, the easy disposability of
the evidence may have frustrated the searches. In addition, police were very concerned
with "leaks" reaching the suspects. Factors such as these, however, can be expected to
influence equally the success rates of "questionable" and "acceptable" warrants.




49. An alternate explanation could be adduced. If police perjury were prevalent-that
is, if police consistently fabricated the affidavits to meet the Aguilar-Spinelli test-then
the failure rate of the "questionable" and the "acceptable" warrants might not be
expected to display any significant disparity. Our data does not permit us to decide
conclusively between these two hypotheses, but even if the absence of any correlation
between success rates and apparent compliance with Supreme Court standards is the
product of widespread police perjury, my policy recommendation is the same. See note
70 infra.
50. See, e.g., Cratty v. United States, 163 F.2d 844, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Note, The
Outwardly Sufficient Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note 16, at 134.
51. See, e.g., cases cited in Note, The Outwardly Sufficient Search Warrant Affidavit,
supra note 16, at 134 n.138.
52. See, e.g., cases cited in id. at 134 n.139.
53. The prosecutor we interviewed went on to say:
[T]he informer is usually ignorant of his rights and admits possession. Having
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people give information for reasons other than the call of civic duty.
The factors motivating undisclosed informants have been widely
recognized by commentators and police alike5 4 These motives include
offers of immunity or sentence reduction in exchange for coopera-
tion 55 promises of money payments, usually on a per tip basis,503 and
such perverse motives as revenge57 or the hope of eliminating crim-
inal competition. 58 In sum,
The reliability of such persons is obviously suspect. The fact
that their information may have produced convictions in the
past does not justify taking their reports on faith .... [I]t is to
be expected that the informer will not infrequently reach for
shadowy leads, or even seek to incriminate the innocent.50
done so, he has no choice but to make a deal .... [T]o keep the informer's identity
secret, pushers are arrested for possession instead of sale.
For a criticism of these practices, see Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the
Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in tlhe Administration of Justice, 69 YME L.J.
543, 562-73 (1960).
54. See, e.g., M. HARNEY & J. CRoss, THE INFORMER IN LAw ENFORCEMEN!T 32.49 (1960);
BRODSKY, supra note 3, at 34-36; Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool
Pigeons and Agents Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1094 (1951); Note, The Outwardly
Sufficient Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note 16, at 133-34.
55. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 53, at 565-67. These offers may be especially at-
tractive to narcotics informants since sentences for possession are often unusually long.
In Connecticut, for example, a person arrested for possession who does not cooperate
risks five years imprisonment for the first offense and fifteen for the second. See CoNN.
GEN. STAT. REv. § 19-481 (Supp. 1969).
56. Paying addicts for information is especially prevalent. For example, Brodsky
found that the payment per tip in the California municipality he studied averaged ten
dollars. This amount was generally used to finance the informant's drug habit. BnoDSFY,
supra note 3, at 35. Police in Washington, D.C., reportedly supplied narcotics to inform-
ants who were unable to obtain them through the usual illicit channels. See Jones v.
United States, 266 F.2d 924, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1959). In New York City reptlar informers
are paid a "retainer" of forty dollars per month and are given narcoucs in exchange
for particular tips. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1971, at 45. col. 8. See also Note, The Out-
wardly Sufiient Search Warrant Affidavit, supra note 16, at 133 n.134; N.Y. Times,
Mar. 11. 1972. at 14, col. 7 (1500 dollars paid to F.B.I. informant). Because police
readily attribute the failure of a warrant to turn up evidence to causes other than the
unreliability of informants, see note 44 supra, financial reimbursement does not assure
consistently accurate information.
57. The desire for revenge "may come only from a feeling by a member of a criminal
group that he is being discriminated against or is not given the preferment or oppor-
tunity to which he thinks his talents entitle him. Sometimes a desire for revenge arises
from factors independent from criminal enterprise. Jealousies and quarrels over women
may set at each other's throats, bosom companions who once were as thick as thieves."
HARNEY & CROss, supra note 54, at 35. In some cases, then, information supplied to
police for the purpose of vengeance will be accurate, but in others, it will be incorrect.
For example, rather than implicate a friend who sold him narcotics, an informant may
seek to incriminate an enemy whom he suspects may be selling, although he may have
no personal knowledge of the illegal activities. If the informant does report that lie
purchased contraband from an individual with whom he actually had no contact, police
may truthfully prepare a warrant application which, on its face. complies with the
Aguilar-Spinelli particular knowledge requirement. In these circumstances, the protective
value of the Court's standard will be lost.
58. See HARNEY & CRoss, supra note 54, at 35-36.
59. Jones v. United States, 266 F.2d 924. 928 (D.C. Cir. 1959). The court also pointed
out that "[t]he practice of paying fees to the informer for the cases he makes may also
be expected, from time to time, to induce him to lure non-users into the drug habit
and then entrap them into more violations:' Id.
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As a result, the Aguilar-Spinelli criteria do not ensure the reliability
of tips from the overwhelming majority of police informants-the
admitted criminals, addicts, and stool pigeons who volunteer infor-
mation in order to promote their own special interests.00 The general
reliability criterion may establish that an upstanding citizen with
whom the police have previously dealt does not exaggerate or assert
imaginary happenings. But the fact that the typical informant, often
operating from inherently suspect motives, may have given accurate
information some unknown number of times in the past provides no
assurance that he is not now seeking revenge on an enemy or impli-
cating an innocent person. 1 Similarly, the particular knowledge cri-
terion is of little value when applied to the usual informant. To be
sure, a magistrate may be in a better position to evaluate the reliability
of the report of a presumably reliable police undercover agent if the
officer states the underlying basis of his knowledge and the particular
details of his relationship with the suspect. But an assertion of per-
sonal observation or involvement by the usual informant-one whose
veracity is inherently suspect-can add little to the equation. 2 That
the use of such tests03 does not enhance the success rates of informer-
based warrants is therefore not surprising.
60. Mr. Justice Harlan was sensitive to this factor. In Jaben v. United States, 381
U.S. 214, 224 (1965), he noted that "unlike narcotics informants . . .whose credibility
may often be suspect, the sources in this tax evasion case are much less likely to produce
false or untrustworthy information." Similarly, in United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573,
600 (1971), he argued in dissent that:
[w]ithout violating the confidences of his source, the agent surely could describe
for the magistrate such things as the informer's general background, employment,
personal attributes that enable him to observe and relate accurately, position In
the community, reputation with others . . .and the like.
See also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (general reliability test easily
met for local police officers and federal investigators).
61. In some cases, the police assertion that an informant has supplied correct infor-
mation may be mistaken. See Note, The Outwardly Sufficient Search Warrant Affidavit,
supra note 16, at 134-35. In the Connecticut city we studied, in order to protect the
anonymity of informants, police kept no records of prior information supplied by
specific individuals. Instead, the usual warrant statement that an informant has given
information leading to arrest or conviction on a certain number of past occasions was
based on the recollections of the officers involved.
The efficacy of altering the general construction of the Aguilar.Spinelli general re,
liability test to require a statement of the number of incorrect as well as correct tips
supplied by an informant in the past is discussed at note 68 infra.
62. Cf. note 57 supra.
63. This conclusion is not altered by the inclusion of those warrants containing
"curative" averments, a possibility left open by Spinelli and seized upon in Harris, see
pp. 705-08 supra. Police verification of detailed descriptive facts supplied by an informant,
as in Draper (see note 9 supra), logically can provide no basis for believing that the
informant knew that the suspect was acting illegally. Knowledge of a person's dress or
travel plans may merely indicate that the informant was acquainted with the suspect antd
knew his daily habits. See, e.g., Note, supra note 15. Other forms of police corroboration
of informer tips are discussed in more detail at pp. 715-18 infra.
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III. Toward A More Meaningful Test for Probable Cause
Alternatives to the existing standards for judging probable cause
in informer-based warrants are not lacking. For example, since many
informer-based warrants that do not meet the Aguilar-Spinelli criteria
do result in successful searches, it might be argued that a warrant
should be granted without any inquiry into whether or not a sub-
stantial basis exists for the police opinion that the informer's tip
should be pursued. 64 At the other extreme, it has been suggested that
no weight should ever be given to informer tips05 or that McCray v.
Illinois6 6 should be overruled and an informant's identity be disclosed
at a probable cause hearing. 7
Fortunately, however, the course between complete deference to
police acumen and forbidding all reliance on undisclosed informants
is navigable.68 Information provided by the usual unidentified in-
former whose motives are prima facie suspect would nevertheless be
acceptable if a test could be devised whereby a magistrate could assure
, 64. It is difficult to predict the frequency with which searches would be successful
in such circumstances. If the Connecticut data is representative. informcr-based searches
are successful more than half the time, but it is impossible to know how many warrants
are not even requested because the police know the issuing magistrate will inquire
into the basis of their judgment.
But even if it could be conclusively demonstrated that the police seek a marrant only
when they feel a suspect is guilty and that such police intuition is correct in most cases,
the argument for unfettered police discretion would not stand. The probable cause
requirement is more than a matter of probability. Rather, probable cause has been
defined by a balancing of the privacy rights which the Fourth Amendment embraces
against the police needs of the state. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 US. 523, 534-37
(1967); State v. Kasabucki. 52 N.J. 110, 116. 244 A.2d 101. 104 (1968). Thus. in Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), generally accepted police practices were declared illegal
without an inquiry into whether wide-ranging searches made concurrent to arrest usually
turned up evidence. On the other hand, in Camnara, supra, area-wide searches for health-
code violations were permitted even though, as to any given household in the area, the
probability of uncovering violations was obviously very small.
65. See generally BRODSKY, supra note 2.
66. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
67. See, e.g., Fabrikant, Probable Cause and the Confidential Informant, 1 Cntsu. L.
BuLL. 1 (1965); Quinn, McCray v. Illinois: Probable Cause and the Informner Privilege,
45 Da.vR L.J. 399 (1968). It has also been contended that even if the informant's identity
is kept secret, allowing the defendant to challenge by cross-examination of the police
affiant the accuracy of the allegations in a warrant affidavit at a pre.trial hearing would
be a significant advance. See, e.g., Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits As
a Ground for Suppressing Evidence, 84 HAlv. L. REv. 8 (1971). While this procedure
might be valuable in conjunction with the reform advocated below, little would be
gained by such "piercing" under current standards since a policeman under cross.exami-
nation could in all honest) repeat assertions which had been fabricated by an undisclosed
informant deemed reliable under the Aguilar-Spinelli tests.
68. Justice Douglas' view that the tips of anonymous informants should have no place
in probable cause determinations, see note 10 supra, has never commanded a majority
of the Court, and it appears that such arguments can expect little judicial sympathy at
a time when it is generally thought that information from undisclosed informants is
essential to effective law enforcement in areas such as narcotics violations. See, e.g.,
United States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992, 996 (2d Cir. 1971) (Moore, J., dissenting). cert.
denied, 92 S. Ct. 541 (1971); HARNEY & CRoss. supra note 54, at 18-19; Barrett, Police
Practices and the Law, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 11 (1962).
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himself in each case that the informant is supplying truthful and
probative information. Further elaboration of the Agitilar-Spinelli
criteria as to the general reliability and particular knowledge of the
informant probably cannot accomplish this result, 9 but a require-
ment relating to police corroboration might. The proposal here is
that to establish probable cause a showing should be made in each
case involving undisclosed informant tips that police investigation has
uncovered probative indications of criminal activity along the lines
suggested by the informant.70 This police investigation need not gen-
erate, in and of itself, enough evidence to establish probable cause.71
But it should indicate the presence of some suspicious activity of the
69. The general reliability requirement might be further refined by demanding a
statement of the informant's overall "batting average," i.e., the ratio of prioi correct
tips to prior incorrect tips. Three basic difficulties are involved in this approach. First,
where should the threshold for reliability be set? W1ould fiftyione per cent success in
the past suffice? Or should ninety or even 100 per cent be required? If the acceptability
level is low, the informer's past record does not justify much confidence in Ills present
tip. But if the level were very high, there would be a strong incentive for police falslfl-
cation. Second, to cope with the latter problem, effective enforcement of the procedure
would require disclosure of the files to defense attorneys-a requirement which might
jeopardize the anonymity of the informant. Third, even if a typical informant has
given accurate information on, say, two out of two past occasions, he may be motivated
to fabricate the information the third time. See p. 713 supra.
Further explication of the particular knowledge standard would also be pointless,
for however detailed the requirement of personal observation or involvement may be,
the assertions originate with the very person whose credibility is being questioned. Cf.
p. 714 supra. But see United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 591 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
70. As the example presented in the text will show, this requirement is very dif-
ferent from the "curative" corroboration allowed under Spinelli and Harris. Under
those cases, it is "always open to the officer to seek corroboration of the tip," United
States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 600 (1971) (dissenting opinion), but he need not do so
unless the two-pronged Aguilar test has not been met. The proposed standard treats
corroboration as mandatory rather than remedial. Furthermore, the class of adequate
corroborative assertions is more limited under the proposed standard. Probative mmdi.
cations of criminal activities of the type suggested by the informant rather than, as
under Draper, innocent behavioral patterns, would have to be verified.
It might be contended that requiring corroboration of every informer tip goes too far
since the presumption of unreliability does not apply to the trained police undercover
agent and to the upstanding member of the community who seeks anonymity out of
fear of physical retaliation. Certainly the requirement might be altered to account for
this observation by allowing the affiant to supply enough details as to the informant's
background to permit the magistrate to conclude that the particular informant is ami
exception to the generalization of informer unreliability (cf. note 60 supra) in Ilett of
a corroborative investigation. On balance, however, it is probably wiser not to depart
from a uniform rule of corroboration, for if the requirement could be avoided by merely
alleging that the informant is an undercover agent, a strong inducement for police
fabrication in drafting warrant affidavits would be present. Cf. P. ClIEVIGNY, l'OLICE
POWER (1969); J. SKOLNICK, JUsTIcE WITHOUT TRIAL 214-15 (1966). Falsifying elements
relating to the reliability of an unnamed informer is considerably easier than detailing
the existence and results of an independent, corroborative investigation, especially if
"piercing" of the affidavit allegations is permitted, see note 67 supra.
71. Of course, it would be desirable if the investigation were to do so, For instance,
questions as to informant reliability were not vital in United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102 (1965), an illegal distillery case, because police observation documented different
occasions when a car was driven to the rear of the suspect's house with loads of sugar
and five-gallon tins, when the odor of fermenting mash was detected near the house,
and when the sounds of distillery machinery were heard in the vicinity of the house.
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character suggested by the informant's tip which, taken together with
that tip and any other averments in the warrant affidavits, might
reasonably be said to amount to a showing of probable cause.7"
The manner in which this approach would operate can be illustrated
by resorting to a not too unrealistic hypothetical case. Suppose that
a police affidavit is submitted in support of an application for a war-
rant to search the premises of 123 Stratton Road. The affidavit re-
counts the statements of a "reliable person" who has given "correct
information leading to conviction on ten past occasions." The in-
formant, whose name is not given, has told the police that every
Tuesday evening at eight P.M. suspect A drives up to his girl friend's
house at the address given above in a blue convertible bearing the
license plate 6N4-8524, that A carries a brown attach6 case which
contains heroin into the house which he uses as a base for the sale
of narcotics, and that he learned of A's activities by buying narcotics
from A at the indicated address several times in the recent past.
Should the magistrate, on the strength of this affidavit, grant the
warrant? Since both general reliability ("prior correct information
leading to conviction") and particular knowledge (personal involve-
ment) are set forth, the answer under Aguilar is clearly in the affirma-
tive. Indeed, even if the allegation of prior correct information were
not made, issuance might conceivably be justified under Harris,73 and
even if the informant had not admitted to a personal purchase of
narcotics, the warrant could validly be granted under Draper if the
affidavit also indicated that the police saw A drive up to 123 Stratton
Road last. Tuesday in the blue convertible and carry the brown at-
tach6 case indoors.7 4 Nevertheless, under the approach advocated here,
72. For example, in Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), a warrant Was invali-
dated which stated only that federal officers who were investigating the theft of whiskey
twice observed large cartons being loaded into a car in a residential district. If this
police observation were combined with a specific inforinant tip, it might have sufficed
to establish probable cause, though this hypothetical lies at the borderline elen tinder
the proposed standard. Data relating to general trustworthiness of the informer might
also be considered in the mix of factors pertinent to the probable cause dctermination.
A general statement of what elements must be present in what degrees to establish
probable cause is not possible, but this is a problem endemic to the field of search and
seizure and arrest law. This Comment is concerned with the narrower question of when
an informer's tip should be admissible as an element in the probable cause determination.
73. Under the Chief justice's opinion, the fact that the infornation was against
penal interest and that the police regarded the inforner to be reliable could be adduced
to uphold the issuance. See p. 707 supra. On the other hand, since there is no reputation
evidence impeaching A, even if the plurality opinion in Harris is accepted at face %alue.
it should not support granting the warrant under the circumstances sketched above.
74. See note 9 supra. See also United States v. Manning. 448 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1971)
(en banc) (construing Harris to mean that police corroboration of innocent behavioral
patterns would establish probable cause even in the absence of a showing of general
reliability), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 541 (1971).
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the warrant should not be granted, whether or not the informant
admitted to purchasing narcotics and whether or not the police cor-
roborated the fact that A visited his girl friend as predicted. The
outcome would be otherwise, however, if police surveillance had un-
covered truly suspicious activities along the lines suggested by the
tip. For example, if the police observed known narcotics users enter-
ing and leaving the premises in question beginning soon after A's
arrival, the surveillance (which might not, in itself, establish probable
cause)75 would show sufficiently suspicious activity to justify crediting
the informant's tip in the particular case.
As this illustration indicates, the approach suggested here would
give more protection to the individual and lead to a more realistic
assessment of probable cause than do existing standards, because it
would require the magistrate to consider whether it is reasonable
to believe that the unidentified informant is telling the truth in this
instance and vis-a-vis this subject. Furthermore, when an informant
knows that the report he gives will be tested by independent surveil-
lance, he will be more likely to resist the temptation to fabricate
reports of criminality in order to satisfy grudges, protect friends, or
receive money payments.70 Thus, implementation of a requirement of
police corroboration should not only succeed in screening out un-
reliable tips7T but should also improve the quality of informant tips
in general.
75. Cf. Sibron v. United States, 392 U.S. 40, 62 (1968).
76. "Knowledge that there is such surveillance serves to prevent, double.dealing by
persons in an extra-official capacity and to get a fuller measure of assistance Iront
these." M. HARNEY & J. CRoss, NARCOTIC OFFICER'S HANDBOOK 135 (1961).
77. We sought to verify the claim that a strict corroboration requirement would
screen out unreliable tips by testing for a correlation between success rates and adequacy
of police surveillance alleged in our sample of warrants. However, the number of warrants
on which we had suitable information as to both success and the degree of surveillance
was small and did not permit us to establish statistical significance at the usual sig.
nificance levels. See Appendix, Table 6 infra. Nevertheless, comparison of Tables 5 anti 6
is at least suggestive. Table 5 shows the surprising result that those warrants which
passed a strict application of the Aguilar.Spinelli test were, on the average, less successful
in terms of uncovering evidence than those which were questionable under the same
criteria. On the other hand, the correlation in Table 6 is in the expected direction:
informer warrants that were granted after adequate police surveillance were, on the
average, more successful in producing evidence than those which entailed either no
surveillance at all or insufficient surveillance.
In Table 6, in determining which instances of surveillance were adequate and which
were not, we treated warrants which involved no surveillance as unacceptable. We also
regarded as unacceptable those warrants for which the surveillance produced only infor.
mation of very weak probative ialue, such as Draper-type facts. In most instances, our
evaluation of the probative force of the items verified did not require great subtlety.
For example, police investigations which established only that the informer gave anl
accurate statement of the suspect's automobile registration number were counted as
unacceptable. Because of our uncertainty as to the proper treatment of "apartment house
718
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Despite these appealing characteristics, however, two objections
can be made of the proposed corroboration requirement. First, it
might be argued that there is a real possibility that judicial pressure
for supplementary investigation of this sort would strain limited police
resources. But this claim is easily exaggerated. In fact, there is reason
to believe that further investigation is presently conducted in the
preponderance of cases involving informer tips,- and that a substan-
tial portion of these investigations are already of the type that would
validate the informant's tip under the standard advocated here.--
Moreover, some increased expenditure of police investigative re-
sources, in light of the acknowledged unreliability of most informers,-"
seems a small price to pay for the promotion of Fourth Amendment
interests.81
The second major objection to an across-the-board corroborative
investigation requirement goes to the nature of what is to be cor-
roborated. For it will not always be clear which observations along
the lines suggested by the informant's tip are probative of illegal
activity rather than merely representative of an innocent pattern of
behavior known to the informant.82 In considering this objection,
buys," however, see note 82 infra, we excluded from the anal)sis warrants in which the
police investigation took the form of an informant "buy." The "bu)" technique is
described at note 78 infra.
78. More than ninety per cent of the inforer-based warrant cases in our suriey
involved some supplemental police investigation. See Appendix. Table 3 inlra. The police
investigation generally took one of two forms: surveillance or "buys." Typically. the
place of the alleged criminal activity was observed, the comings and goings of untusual
numbers of people or of known addicts or gamblers recorded, and, in a few cases, illegal
transactions such as placing bets or passing policy slips were noted. Some surtieillanccs
were very brief, while others were quite extensive. Somewhat less frequently, the police
would set up an informer buy in which the informer is taken to the locus of the alleged
criminal activity and searched to ensure that he is not concealing contraband. He is
then given a quantity of money and instructed to purchase contraband at the place
under investigation. The extent to which buys and surveillance are enplo)ed -arics
significantly among localities. For example, although we found that the buy technique
was used in seventeen per cent of the informer warrant cases in 1969, Brodsky reports
that some variant of that procedure was employed in ninety-five per cent of the California
cases. See BRODSKY, supra note 3. at 38.
79. Between thirty and sixty per cent of tie informer uarrants in our survey were
granted after police surveillance which corroborated probative elements of the inforuant's
tip. See Appendix, Table 3 infra.
80. See pp. 712-13 supra; Brief for Petitioner at 14, United States v. Harris, 403 U.S.
573 (1971).
81. Cf. Note, supra note 4, at 63 n.55.
82. In Spinelli, for instance, extensive police surveillance was conducted in an effort
to verify the informer's tip, but the only arguably probative item uncovered was the
fact that Spinelli, who was suspected of bookmaking, spent considerable time at an
apartment which contained two telephones. The majority saw "nothing unusual about
an apartment containing two separate telephones" since "(ir]any a householder indulges
himself in this petty luxury." 393 U.S. at 414. On the other hand, the dissent took a
less cordial view of these facts, insisting that "[nlothing in the record indicates that
the apartment was of that large and luxurious type which could only be occupied by a
person to whom it would be a 'petty luxury' to have two separate phones, with different
numbers, both listed under the name of a person who did not live there." Id. at 430.
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it is important to observe that the need for judicial definition of the
quantity and quality of police-obtained corroborative information
which suffices to substantiate an unreliable informant's tip is a press-
ing problem under the existing standards as well. 3 Hence the recog-
nition that it would remain a problem under the approach recom-
mended here does not argue against pursuing that approach. 4 Proba-
tive indications of criminal activity obtained through police investi-
gations can be defined only in the context of specific circumstances,
and since the number of factual combinations is practically unlimited,
an exhaustive listing of what investigatoly discoveries are properly
considered probative for the purpose of corroborating an informant's
tip is virtually impossible. Nonetheless, certain patterns of activity
characteristic of illegal gambling, bootlegging, and the like are dis-
cernible.8 5 Judicial decisions as to what observations should support
an informer's tip in these circumstances are entirely feasible and would
provide predictable, dispositive standards for the great majority of
cases.86
In short, a general requirement of meaningful police corroboration
of the accusations of undisclosed informants would be a workable
and inherently more reliable means for bolstering the credibility of
informer tips. The Fourth Amendment's command that "no warrant
shall issue, but upon probable cause"87 should mean no less.
A more frequent border-line situation arises from the use of the buy technique de-
scribed at note 78 supra. In a large number of cases the premises which the informant
is seen entering and leaving are apartment houses. In these circumstances there is
normally no assurance that the informant has not purchased contraband in one apart-
ment while alleging that the purchase took place in another. Lower federal courts are
divided on the question of whether an observed apartment house buy can be validly
considered by a magistrate in the probable cause determination. Compare United States
ex rel. Rogers v. Warden, 381 F.2d 209, 219 (2d Cir. 1967), with Jones v. United States,
353 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
83. See, e.g., Note, Search and Seizure-Hearsay as Grounds for Probable Cause, 21
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 135, 143 (1969); Note, The Supreme Court, 1968 Terin 83 HArY.
L. REV. 7, 180-81 (1969).
84. In fact, focusing attention on the probative force of investigations in particular
should lead in the long run to a clearer set of judicial standards than seems possible
under the present approach of directing investigatory requirements toward corroboration
of the minimally useful informer reliability criteria.
85. See generally HARNEY & CRoss, supra note 76.
86. Typical results of police strveillance in the municipality we studied are mentioned
at notes 43 and 77 supra. Adjudication to determine the validity of such observations
in establishing probable cause when combined with informer tips does not appear to
raise unduly difficult problems. For instance, the fact that an informant correctly reports
the number of a suspect's license plate is not probative of any criminal activity. Similarly,
verification of an anonymous informer's report that an individual, allegedly a policy
runner, travels from points A to 1B to G should not be sufficient to show probable cause.
On the other hand, when combined with independent evidence that points A, B and C
are frequented predominantly by known gamblers, the informant's tip and the surveil.
lance of the reputed messenger could reasonably be held to demonstrate probable cause,
87. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
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Appendix
Table I
Search Warrants Granted and Sampled. By Type of Crime
1968 1969
4,*. 4*,. ,4,*.
Type of Crime Granted %P Sampled %b Granted %, Satmpled %P
Gambling 50 34 50 100 88 1 44 50
Liquor 27 18 27 100 24 1.4 12 50
Narcotics 60 40 60 100 46 27 23 50
Other 8 6 8 100 14 8 14 100
Total, 145 98 145 100 172 100 93 54
a. Warrants relating to a type of crime as a percentage of total warrants.
b. Warrants sampled as a percentage of warrants granted.
c. In this and all other tables percentages may not total 100 due to errors in rounding
off each figure to the nearest per cent.
Table 2
Informer-Based Search Warrants Sampled, By Type of Crime
1968 1969
Type of Crime ,.u.
Gambling 26 52 31 70
Liquor 25 93 8 67
Narcotics 54 90 19 83
Other 1 13 1 7
Total 106 73 59 63
a. Informer-based warrants relating to a type of crime as a percentage of all warrants
(regardless of source of information) relating to that type of crime.
Table 3
Distribution of Informer Warrants According to Type of Corroboration Alleged
1968 1969
Type of Corroboration -x -L
None 7 7 4 7
"Weak" Surveillance, 18 17 8 14
"Strong" Surveillanceb 34 30 37 63
"Buy"' 47 44 10 17
a. Police surveillance, not involving the "buy" technique, was alleged but was judged
by the study researchers to be insufficient under Spinelli v. United States, 393 Us.
410 (1969). See note 43 supra.
b. Police surveillance, not involving the "buy" technique, was alleged and judged by
the study researchers to be sufficient under Spinelli v. United States, 393 US. 410
(1969). See note 43 supra.
c. See note 78 supra.




General Reliability Deficiency +
Inadequate Corroboration
No Allegation of Prior Correct Information +
No Corroboration
Allegation of "Prior Arrests" + No Corroboration
No Allegation of Prior Correct Information +
"Weak" Surveillance
Allegation of "Prior Arrests" + "Weak" Surveillance
No Allegation of Prior Correct Information +
Apartment House Buy
Allegation of "Prior Arrests" + Apartment
House Buy
Particular Knowledge Deficiency +
Inadequate Corroboration
Source of Informer Knowledge Not Specified +
No Corroboration
Source of Informer Knowledge Not Specified +
"Weak" Corroboration
Source of Informer Knowledge Not Specified +
Apartment House Buy
Total
3 3 0 0
3 2 3 3
2 1 2 2
4 3 2 3
a. For explanation of categories, see note 43 supra.
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